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Is a Higher Calling Enough? 
Incentive Compensation in the Church 
 
Abstract 
We study the compensation and productivity of more than 2,000 Methodist ministers in a 
43-year panel data set.  The church appears to use pay-for-performance incentives for its 
clergy, as their compensation follows a sharing rule by which pastors receive 
approximately 3 percent of the incremental revenue from membership increases.  The 
elasticity between ministers’ pay and parish size is similar to the firm size elasticity of 
compensation for public company CEOs.  Among a range of possible performance 
measures, those with the greatest informativeness about pastoral effort are linked most 
closely to compensation.
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The parochial clergy are like those teachers whose reward depends partly upon their 
salary, and partly upon the fee or honoraries which they get from their pupils; and 
these must always depend more or less upon their industry and reputation. 
- Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book 5, Chapter 1, Part 3, Article 3 
If we have sown spiritual seed among you, is it too much if we reap a material harvest 
from you?  If others have this right of support from you, shouldn't we have it all the 
more? 
 - Corinthians 9: 11-13 
 
 
I.   Introduction 
The Holy Bible and The Wealth of Nations are two of the most influential books 
in history.  These texts sometimes differ when assessing the social importance of 
financial contracts (see, for instance, Jesus’s treatment of the Money Changers).  
Nevertheless, the quotations above show that both the Bible and Adam Smith placed 
value upon a sound remuneration system for members of the clergy. 
In this paper we investigate the compensation arrangements of a large sample of 
pastors who minister to Methodist congregations in the American Midwest.  We evaluate 
whether clergy receive meaningful pay-for-performance incentives, an arrangement that 
might seem unlikely for a number of reasons.  Many pastors answer the call to ministry 
as a result of strong religious beliefs or an impulse to serve, and this intrinsic motivation 
might crowd out the need for more explicit incentives (Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole, 
1999).  Strong pay-for-performance incentives might damage a minister’s spiritual 
credibility with a congregation that expects intrinsic motivation to be sufficient.  Finally, 
churches are not-for-profit entities and have no clear residual claimants who might 
optimize compensation policy (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Notwithstanding these obstacles to efficient contracting, we find abundant 
evidence that the compensation of ministers conforms to standard principal-agent models.  
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We analyze an extensive panel dataset covering all 727 United Methodist churches and 
2,201 ministers who served in the state of Oklahoma between 1961 and 2003.  We find 
that when a new member joins a church, its minister’s annual compensation increases by 
just under $15 (all values are expressed in constant 2008 dollars).  When a member 
leaves a congregation, the minister’s pay falls by about $7.  These effects translate to a 
pay elasticity with respect to membership of approximately 0.35, virtually identical to the 
pay-firm size elasticity for corporate CEOs (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988).  Based 
upon the stream of donations associated with a typical church member, we argue that 
ministers’ incentives operate as a type of sharing rule, by which a pastor is paid close to 3 
percent of the incremental revenue that typically accrues to a church when a new member 
joins.  We also find evidence of indirect incentives that arise from the possibility of 
successful clergy to be reassigned to parishes that offer higher pay and perquisites, 
particularly housing. 
For incentive compensation to succeed in a church, congregants must be able to 
attribute various measures of output, such as membership or donations, either to a 
minister’s actions or to exogenous factors.  Connecting output to an agent’s effort can be 
problematic in many business settings, because a worker’s choice of effort is private, 
preventing the principal from observing it or writing incentive contracts based upon it.  
See Holmstrom (1979) and Banker and Datar (1989).  As a result, a principal typically 
offers a second-best contract based upon output that can be inverted to obtain an estimate 
of the agent’s unobserved effort. 
Our dataset provides several specific output measures that provide insight into a 
pastor’s effort level.  We can decompose a parish’s membership changes into three main 
categories: transfers within the Methodist denomination, transfers between 
denominations (e.g., Methodist to Baptist), and transfers in and out of the Christian faith.  
While a minister likely has little to do with a person’s decision to embrace or reject an 
entire religion, he or she may be the dominant factor in a congregant’s decision of which 
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Methodist church to join, either because of his charisma as a speaker or his diligence in 
providing services such as hospital visits or counseling. 
 We find that changes in ministers’ pay exhibit significant connections to 
informative measures of membership changes, and no connections to uninformative 
measures.  A minister’s annual salary increases by about $18 when a member joins the 
church “by profession of faith,” synonymous with formally committing to the Christian 
religion.  The pay increase is about twice as high, approximately $33, for adding new 
members who defect from other Methodist churches.  Losing a member to another 
Methodist church leads to a downward revision in compensation of even greater 
magnitude, approximately $43.  In contrast, losing a member to death results in no 
discernable change in a minister’s pay.  These results parallel the findings of other 
empirical papers that show that when several performance measures can be observed by a 
principal, the variable with the strongest signal-to-noise ratio becomes the basis for the 
agent’s contract.  Examples include Lambert and Larcker (1987) for corporate CEOs and 
Ittner, Larcker, and Pizzini (2007) for doctors in group practices. 
While we find a significant relation between membership changes and pastoral 
compensation, the strength of the connection varies cross-sectionally across parishes.  
This variation arises because some churches experience more volatile patterns of 
membership changes than others, thereby exposing their ministers to more compensation 
risk.  Executive pay research such as Aggarwal and Sanwick (1999) finds that CEO pay 
becomes less sensitive to performance when the underlying performance measure is 
risky.  We find similar results for clergy.  We sort all churches by the volatility of their 
membership changes and then assign them to “high” and “low” volatility categories.  
Churches with volatile membership exhibit less ministerial pay-for-performance with 
respect to membership. 
One reason for the variation in churches’ membership patterns over time arises 
from the impact of the price of oil, which plays a significant role in Oklahoma’s 
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economy.  Oil affects individual regions of the state very differently, and certain 
localities will experience fluctuations in population and economic growth when oil prices 
rise or fall.  We run church-by-church regressions of membership on the price of oil and 
its lag, and then rank churches by the percent of total membership variation explained by 
oil prices.  Consistent with our other results, churches highly exposed to oil prices shift 
compensation risk away from their ministers, paying them less for membership changes 
and offering them higher base salaries. 
Our paper contributes to several lines of research in finance and economics.  A 
nascent literature has studied the role of incentive compensation in the non-profit sector.  
Leading papers include Hallock (2002) and Brickley and Van Horn (2002).  Although 
non-profits comprise a significant portion of the national economy, they face few 
disclosure requirements and therefore are rarely studied by empirical economists.  A 
large literature has examined the economics of religion, which is reviewed by Iannaccone 
(1998).  This literature includes several prior studies of the compensation of clergy, all of 
which use cross-sectional data to estimate the determinants of pay across churches. 
McMillan and Price (2003) and Haney (2008) use a survey of 883 pastors across nearly 
100 different faiths to evaluate relations between compensation and church structure, 
location and size.  Trawick and Lile (2007) studies Southern Baptist congregations and 
finds that ministers' pay is higher in areas where Southern Baptist churches have a greater 
concentration.   Zech (2007) finds that ministers in larger communities earn more pay, 
while their pay is unrelated to self-reported performance scores.  None of these papers 
takes a time series approach or uses objective performance criteria in order to evaluate 
the strength of pay-for-performance incentives, which is the main focus of our work. 
Our analysis is limited to the day-to-day activities of ordinary church pastors who 
deliver sermons on Sundays and minister to their congregations during the rest of the 
week.  Some charismatic American clergymen have earned fortunes through book 
royalties, televangelism, and charging fees for access to sacred texts, but those 
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entrepreneurial activities are beyond the scope of our study and probably have little 
overlap with the work of the Midwestern clergy in our sample. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes our data.  
Section III presents our analysis of pay-for-performance for clergy in hundreds of 
Oklahoma Methodist parishes.  Section IV concludes. 
 
II.   Data description 
Our study uses data on pastoral compensation provided to us by a unit of the 
United Methodist Church, the second largest Protestant denomination in the United 
States.  The Methodist church came to the U.S. in the 18th century, not long after its 
founding at Oxford University in England by theologian John Wesley.  The 
denomination’s current organizational form in the U.S. resulted from mergers in 1939 
and 1968 between several related branches that had separated in the 19th century due to 
doctrinal and administrative disagreements.  With approximately 8 million members 
today, the United Methodist Church has a reputation for moderate, mainstream Christian 
beliefs and good ecumenical relations with other denominations.  Its members include 
such diverse public figures as George W. Bush and Hillary Rodham Clinton. 
We were fortunate to receive access to a 43-year time series of data about the 
activities and finances of every local parish in the United Methodist Church’s Oklahoma 
Annual Conference.  An Annual Conference, the basic regional organizational unit of the 
church, is led by a Bishop who presides over a Cabinet of District Superintendents.  
These officials exercise central control over decisions related to hiring and assignment of 
individual pastors and, to a lesser degree, their annual compensation.  A pastor typically 
serves a particular congregation for only a few years, as movement is very common 
across churches (but only within an individual Conference).  Some pastors oversee a 
circuit of several smaller parishes. 
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Our data comes from yearly handbooks of the Oklahoma conference compiled for 
each of the years 1961 through 2003.  These handbooks include detailed information 
about each constituent congregation, including expenditures, balance sheet items, and 
membership activities such as baptisms and Sunday School attendance, approximately 
100 variables per parish per year.  We received more than 8,000 pages of data from the 
Oklahoma conference’s handbooks, and we arranged for the data to be scanned into 
spreadsheets and then verified through a series of quality control checks.  The data give 
as a comprehensive sample of 24,989 parish-year observations, with information about 
727 churches, 2,201 pastors, and 7,676 unique pastor-church combinations between 1961 
and 2003.  During our sample period the size of the United Methodist Church in 
Oklahoma remained stable, with 240,378 members in 625 churches in 1961 and 252,567 
members in 548 churches in 2003, although the number of churches fluctuated from year 
to year. 
We focus on the provision of incentives for the head or “senior” minister at each 
church.1  As we analyze the compensation of ministers, it is important to note that the 
individual churches and pastors do not have the power to “screen” or select each other 
through the matching process, since the allocation of labor is done at the Conference 
level, while decisions about pay are made by local congregations.  Ministers receive three 
types of direct compensation: salary, housing, and utilities.2  Although the annual value 
of housing is not reported directly, church yearbooks tabulate the estimated market value 
of each congregation’s living quarters or “parsonage.”  To convert each pastor’s 
occupancy right into a flow of housing consumption, we obtain the annual price-to-rent 
ratio for residential housing in the state, and multiply it by each reported parsonage value.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
! A number of larger churches also have associate pastors who assist the senior pastor.  We do not study the 
incentive provisions for associate pastors. 
  
# United Methodist ministers also receive travel expenses, particularly when serving at multiple churches 
simultaneously, but we do not include these reimbursements as part of compensation. 
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Our results reported below are insensitive to whether we define a pastor’s compensation 
as salary only or also include housing and utilities.  Ministers also receive indirect 
incentives through the possibility of promotion and demotion, as the Conference 
periodically rotates pastors throughout its area of jurisdiction.   
Table 1 presents summary statistics for key variables about ministerial 
compensation and church performance.  All values items are converted to January 2008 
dollars using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers.  We report each 
parish’s ministerial compensation in two forms, as salary only (on the first line) and as 
salary plus housing and utilities (on the second line).  Because some smaller parishes 
share the services of a single minister, we aggregate each individual pastor’s total 
compensation across parishes and report it on the third and fourth lines of Table 1.  The 
table indicates that median pastor compensation, using the broad definition, is about 
$36,900 in 2008 dollars, with an inter-quartile range between $22,651 and $49,586.  A 
few pastors earn in excess of $100,000, with the sample maximum of more than 
$238,000 received by the head of a large church in an urban area. 
Figure 1 shows how the average real compensation of ministers has evolved over 
time between 1961 and 2003.  For comparison purposes, we show a time series of per 
capita personal income in Oklahoma.  Somewhat surprisingly, pastoral compensation 
appears risky, varying significantly over the forty-year horizon for which we have data.  
Mean clergy compensation declined during much of the 1960s and 1970s, before sharply 
increasing in the 1980s and growing at a more moderate rate from the late 1980s onward.  
Over the entire period clerical pay grew at a compound annual real rate of 0.9% per year, 
while per capita income grew much faster, at 1.9% per year. 
The remaining part of Table 1 describes the church characteristics used in our 
analysis.  Membership equals the cumulative number of people who have joined the 
church, less the number who have withdrawn.  Becoming a member is distinct from 
attending church events or services, which anyone is free to.  Membership requires no 
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formal commitment beyond an oath to support the church with one’s “prayers, presence, 
gifts, and service.”  However, joining the church may require some investment of time, 
such as attending classes for new members or (in some circumstances) becoming 
baptized, and members are solicited to support church activities financially and 
otherwise.  In addition to data about each church’s membership, we have information 
about the rates of attendance at Sunday services and Sunday School.  On average, about a 
third of a church’s members attend a given Sunday’s worship services, and about 70% of 
those attending worship will also attend Sunday School. 
We track membership changes from year to year for each parish.  The overall 
membership change variable (!Members) indicates that net membership changes are 
small, with a median value of zero and inter-quartile ranges of +6 and -3.  However, 
churches frequently lose and gain individual members, around 18 on average for both 
gains and losses, such that the net effect is small.  More important than this, however, are 
the specific channels through which members come and go from the church.  Much of 
our analysis relies on these differences, so we describe each in detail. 
Members can be added to the church via Professions of Faith, from Another 
Denomination, or from Another Methodist congregation.  Profession of Faith occurs 
when someone simultaneously joins the United Methodist Church and the Christian 
religion.  Two particularly common ways this occurs are when an adult converts to 
Christianity from another or no religion, and when an adolescent undergoes 
“confirmation,” at or about age 13.  Members can be removed for many of the same 
reasons they are added.  For example, churches can lose members to Other 
Denominations or to Other Methodist churches.  In addition, members can be removed 
for Action or can Withdraw.  Removal for Action usually occurs after an extended period 
of inactivity.  Withdrawing from the church usually coincides with exit from Protestant 
Christianity (otherwise Other Denomination is specified), although this is self-reported 
and not verified upon exit.  Finally, members can be removed by Death.  
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These reasons for joining or leaving a parish differ substantially in the extent to 
which a parish’s senior minister may be involved.  Clearly, some events are completely 
beyond his or her control.  Death is the most obvious example, as is being removed for 
Action.  However, Professions of Faith or transfers to/from Other Denominations are 
more likely to involve the minister, whether through delivery of an inspiring Sunday 
sermon or spending time individually with parishioners during times of need. 
Finally, we tabulate information about annual parish revenues in Table 1.  A 
church’s financial health invariably depends upon the voluntary giving or “tithing” of its 
members.  Revenues at the church level are not explicitly reported by our data source, but 
we can infer annual revenue from each church’s reported expenses (including capital 
improvements to property and equipment), plus the change in the church’s other assets 
(mainly, cash), less the change in total debt.  Inspection of the data reveals some 
problems with the timing of changes in debt and other assets relative to the expenditures, 
so we use two-year averages for these numbers, akin to a mid-year convention.  The 
median (average) church-year in our sample has about $65,000 ($174,000) in revenue, 
corresponding to median (average) revenues per member of $315 ($355). 
 
III.   Evidence of pastoral incentive compensation 
 
A. Basic pay-for-performance models 
We begin our investigation by estimating basic linear pay-for-performance 
regressions over our sample of more than 2,200 Methodist ministers.  We use a fixed 
effects specification that assigns a unique intercept to each minister-church pair, because 
both the pastor and the congregation members might influence either pay or performance.  
For example, a particular minister might be a gifted orator from the pulpit, and a 
particular church may have members that are especially devout or generous.  A particular 
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minister-church pairing may succeed if a certain pastor connects better with a rural 
congregation, or his theology aligns better with the local church.  Our specification is: 
 
! 
Payijt =" ij + #k Performancek,ij + Performancek,ijt$1( )
k=1
n
% +&ijt , (1) 
where i indexes ministers, j churches, and we allow for k = 1,.., n measures of 
performance.  Note that the intercepts capture the average pay for each ij minister-church 
pair, and we decompose each performance measure into a component that is constant for 
a given minister-church pair, 
! 
Performancek,ij , and a time-varying component, 
! 
Performancek,ijt"1 .  Churches each fall recommend compensation adjustments for their 
pastors based on observed outcomes over the previous year, so our performance measures 
are all lagged one year.  We treat the error term, 
! 
"ijt , as heteroskedastic, permitting it to 
have persistence within churches and a common component across churches in a 
particular year.  We then take first differences and estimate: 
 
! 
"Payijt = #tYeart
t=1
T
$ + %k" Performancek,ijt&1( )
k=1
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$ + 'ijt , (2) 
where we include indicator variables, Yeart, to account for common changes in 
compensation across the state for a particular year.  We calculate robust standard errors 
following White (1980), and allow for serial correlation by clustering observations at the 
church level. 
Table 2 shows the regression results.  In the first column, we use the change in 
church membership as an estimate of a pastor’s performance.  Consistent with a pay-for-
performance hypothesis, the membership variable has a positive and significant estimate, 
with a magnitude of about $11 per new member.  We find similar results in the next two 
columns when the performance measures are the increase in each parish’s average 
attendance and the increase in its Sunday School attendance.  Both of these variables 
exhibit positive and significant estimates with magnitudes of about $5 and $7 per 
congregant, respectively. 
Perhaps the most striking result of Table 2 is what does not appear to influence 
the minister’s compensation – the church’s revenues.  We propose several possible 
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interpretations for this pattern.  First, the church’s strategic objective might be to serve 
the greatest number of parishioners, instead of taking in the most revenue.  Second, the 
minister of a congregation might have greater impact upon recruiting new church 
members compared to his effect upon the entire congregation’s decisions about how 
much to donate.  This seems possible in part because most members of a given parish 
would have been recruited by a former pastor, given the relatively short tenures of 
ministers at their churches under the Methodists’ system of regular rotation.  However, 
the explanation that seems most likely to us is that revenues are at best a noisy signal of 
pastoral effort, since church donations are likely to depend heavily on external factors 
linked to the economy.  Figure 2, showing a close connection between per capita income 
in Oklahoma and median church revenue, is consistent with this conjecture. 
 As robustness checks on the estimates in Table 2, we estimate a regression with 
all four independent variables together, with results shown in column 5, and an additional 
model shown in column 6 with the dependent variable equal to the change in the pastor’s 
salary only, instead of his change in total compensation.  We find that when all variables 
are included together the estimate for the attendance variable weakens considerably, 
while the others remain essentially unchanged.  Changing the dependent variable to equal 
salary only has little impact upon the estimates, a pattern that we find in all our models 
throughout the paper.  To save space in subsequent tables, we generally tabulate only 
results based upon total compensation. 
 
B. Detailed performance measures: membership changes of different types 
Even if revenue provides a noisy signal of pastoral performance, it is vital to the 
health of a parish.  Whatever the influence of external economic factors, revenue 
increases almost certainly depend upon membership increases, and certain types of 
members may be more valuable to a parish than others.  We investigate this possibility in 
simple least squares regressions reported in Table 3.  The table shows first-difference 
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estimates of changes in revenue as a function of lagged changes in different categories of 
membership.  In the first column, estimates indicate that a new member leads to a 
significant increase in church revenue of about $451 the next year, while a member lost 
has a negative effect upon revenue that is much smaller in magnitude and not statistically 
significant.  We find that membership changes in either direction have slightly larger 
impacts upon parish revenue if we include lagged terms of the independent variables 
(results not tabulated to save space).  These outcomes may not be surprising if members 
who leave the church might not have been providing much financial support prior to 
departing, while new incoming members might be especially enthusiastic about the 
church’s mission. 
We conjecture that when setting ministers’ compensation, church congregations 
rely upon the performance measures that most clearly reflect their pastors’ effort.  To 
investigate this possibility, we disaggregate increases and decreases in membership into 
different categories.  We use these disaggregated variables as the basis for a further 
regression, with the results reported in the second column of Table 3. 
The more detailed regression model’s estimates indicate that new members of all 
types tend to donate to the church, although the estimate is not significant for those 
joining due to professions of faith.  The most ardent donors appear to be those that 
convert to Methodism and leave another religious denomination.  Among the categories 
of membership departures, almost no change in church revenue occurs when a member 
dies, withdraws from the practice of Christianity, or is dropped from the parish rolls due 
to inactivity; in all three of these cases the member probably had been providing little 
support to their parish due either to ill health or indifference.  We find large decreases in 
parish revenue when a member leaves to join either another denomination or another 
United Methodist congregation, although only the latter is statistically significant.  These 
estimates are generally noisy with fairly large standard errors, but the results seem to give 
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an overall indication that certain types of membership changes impact a parish much 
more than others. 
The results in Table 3 indicate that the Church experiences more financial impact 
from certain types of membership changes than from others, and we would therefore 
expect parish leaderships to be sensitive to these differences when implementing pay-
for-performance incentive compensation.  However, we do not believe the associations 
between membership changes and revenue changes provide sufficient statistics for 
pastoral effort; certain increases in membership that prove lucrative for the church, such 
as professions of faith, may occur more or less as a windfall, driven perhaps by national 
or worldwide events that affect peoples’ attitudes toward religion.  We expect that 
membership changes within the set of United Methodist parishes provide the most 
informative signals of a minister’s effort.  In contrast, membership changes to or from 
other denominations or members who completely withdraw from Christianity are more 
likely to be driven to a larger extent by non-local church doctrine, and membership 
decreases due to inactivity or death may have no connection at all to the minister’s 
performance.  Receiving members by professions of faith could fall somewhere in 
between these other categories.  Professions of faith may be linked partly to non-local 
factors that cause people to embrace religion, but they may also indicate effort by the 
minister in such areas as engaging teenage children of current parishioners.  In sum, we 
expect parishes to provide differential pay incentives to their clergy for different 
categories of membership increases, and the strength of these incentives should depend 
partly upon financial factors but also upon intuition about how much pastoral effort is 
involved in recruiting and retaining members of different types. 
Table 4 investigates the relations between these disaggregated membership 
changes and changes in pastoral compensation.  We begin in column 1 by examining the 
differential impact of overall membership additions and subtractions.  Estimates indicate 
that ministers are rewarded much more when a church parish grows than they are 
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penalized when it shrinks.  A new member adds roughly $15 to a minister’s total 
compensation, while ministerial pay falls by a little under $7 when the parish rolls shrink 
by one member.  Combining these results with the estimates in Table 3, we can 
characterize ministers’ pay-for-performance rewards as a type of sharing rule.  If a new 
member typically donates $451 annually to the church, and the pastor’s compensation 
rises by $15, we would conclude that 3 percent of the incremental revenue stream from a 
new member is dedicated to compensation.  We can develop more refined estimates of 
this statistic by using several lagged values of membership changes, but all are in a 
neighborhood near 3 to 5 percent.  In the other direction, the financial penalty sustained 
by a pastor when a member leaves the church can be characterized as 4 percent of the 
incremental lost revenue stream, which equals the quotient of $6.68 (from Table 4) 
divided by $154 (from Table 3). 
Column 2 presents estimates for a model in which changes in membership are 
broken down into detailed categories.  Several striking results emerge.  As we would 
expect, adding members from other United Methodist Churches has the largest economic 
and statistical effect upon pastoral compensation, estimated to be more than $32 per 
member.  This implies a sharing rule of about 7 percent of the incremental revenue tied to 
a congregant who defects from another parish.  Other types of membership increases do 
not impact pastoral compensation as importantly.  Adding members through professions 
of faith or from other denominations has a smaller point estimate of around $17 each, 
although one category slightly misses having statistical significance.   
When a church loses members, transfers to other United Methodist congregations 
represent the only category that significantly impacts a pastor’s compensation.  These 
transfers within the denomination result in penalties on the order of $43 to the losing 
pastor, even larger than the benefits from recruiting a new member from another United 
Methodist parish.  The remaining reasons why members are lost (action, death, or 
withdrawal) are not significantly related to changes in pastoral pay. 
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C. Detailed performance measures: membership changes in city churches 
Although pastoral compensation is most sensitive to movements of parishioners 
within the set of United Methodist churches, one might argue that these changes do not 
always occur as a consequence of pastoral effort.  Some might arise from exogenous 
circumstances such as job relocations or a parishoner purchasing a new home across 
town.  We gain more insight into the importance of membership transfers within the 
denomination by focusing upon parishes in urban areas.  In cities, churches are more 
densely located and the cost of switching from one United Methodist Church to another 
should be lower.  We therefore expect that within cities, membership changes to and from 
other UMCs should be more informative signals of ministerial effort. 
To test the importance of membership transfers in urban settings, we create an 
indicator variable for churches that are located in the two main cities in Oklahoma (Tulsa 
and Oklahoma City), which we denote City Church.  We then run our regressions with an 
interaction term between City Church and membership changes to or from other United 
Methodist Churches, plus the indicator itself.  Results appear in the third column of Table 
4.  As we expect, pastoral compensation exhibits much greater sensitivity to intra-
denominational transfers if the minister works in an urban location. 
 
D. Lags and elasticities 
 We investigate some alternative pay-performance specifications in Table 5.  In the 
first two columns of the table, we regress the pastor’s change in total compensation 
against the change in membership, including one and two lagged values, respectively.  
The estimates show that churches tie compensation not only to contemporaneous changes 
in membership, but also to changes occurring in the recent past.  The estimated total 
impact of a new member upon the pastor’s compensation would equal the sum of the 
coefficients of these lagged values, or about $15, compared to an estimate of $11 when 
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just the contemporaneous first difference in membership appears in the regression.  Note 
that sample sizes for these regressions drop substantially compared to those in Table 2, 
because higher-order lags of data do not exist for many pastor-church combinations. 
To this point, our empirical specification has measured incentive compensation 
with dollar sensitivities (e.g., dollars per new member), rather than with percentage 
sensitivities scaled by the size of the church.  As Baker and Hall (2004) articulate, the 
former is appropriate when activities have the same dollar impact for large and small 
firms (or churches), while the latter provides better incentives for activities that scale with 
size.  We estimate an alternative model based upon parish size in the third column of 
Table 5, which shows the association between the log of a pastor’s compensation and the 
log of congregation size.  The estimate, which represents the elasticity of pay with respect 
to congregation size, is highly significant with magnitude of 0.35, indicating that 
ministers’ pay rises by approximately one-third when congregation size doubles.  This 
effect is surprisingly close to the typical estimate of 0.30 of public company executive 
compensation with respect to firm size, as found for decades in a large number of 
different samples of major company CEOs (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988; Murphy, 
1999). 
 
E. Exogenous variation in performance measures 
Our analysis above illuminates connections between pastoral compensation and 
changes in parish memberships, and we argue that certain types of membership changes 
receive stronger rewards because of their apparent connection to a minister’s effort.  
While these relations seem economically sensible, we recognize that membership 
changes will provide signals of varying clarity from one parish to another. 
We develop two proxies for the signal-to-noise ratio of how closely membership 
changes reflect pastoral effort at individual churches.  Our first proxy is the church-level 
standard deviation of membership changes.  We use the entire time series of up to 43 
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years per parish to calculate the volatility of each church’s percentage changes in 
membership.  Churches that have volatility above the sample median are grouped 
together and classified by an indicator variable, High Volatility. 
Our second proxy utilizes oil prices as an exogenous factor that partially explains 
church membership.  Oklahoma has a tradition of being an oil-dependent state, but not all 
communities are equally exposed to variation in oil prices.  To the extent that a particular 
community’s economy depends on oil, church membership would be affected at least two 
ways.  First, an oil-generated boom might generate population growth and contribute to 
increased parish membership.  However, an offsetting effect may arise from the well-
documented tendency of religious activity to decline amid higher wealth and income 
(Azzi and Ehrenber, 1975).  We show such a pattern for one Oklahoma community in 
Figure 3, which graphs annual changes in membership of the Shawnee Bethel United 
Methodist Church against annual changes in oil prices.  Shawnee is the county seat of 
Pottawatomie County, which in the 1920’s boasted itself as “The Hub of the World’s 
Largest Oil Fields.”3  As shown in Figure 3, the times series of church membership 
changes and oil price changes behave almost as mirror images.  A closer inspection of the 
data for this parish shows that Shawnee Bethel exhibits both countercyclical membership 
changes (with respect to oil prices), as well as procyclical giving per member.  Each of 
these patterns is consistent with Gruber’s (2004) finding that people substitute higher 
donations for church attendance based upon their marginal utilities for leisure and money. 
To measure the exogenous impact of oil prices upon church membership in 
different parishes, we start by regressing membership for each church on lagged 
membership and a time trend, and calculating the r-squared of that regression (for each 
church).  We then add contemporaneous and lagged oil prices to the regressions and 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
$"See http://www.shawneeok.org/History/Default.asp. 
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calculate the improvement in the r-squared.4  Churches with a change in r-squared greater 
than the median (i.e., where oil explains more of the variation in membership than the 
median across all churches) are grouped together and classified by an indicator variable, 
Oil Driven. 
In Table 6, we present regressions of changes in pastoral compensation against 
changes in membership, including interactions between changes in membership and the 
two indicator variables High Volatility and Oil Driven.  We also include an interaction 
between changes and membership and the average size of the church over the sample in 
order to control for possible size effects on membership volatility or oil exposure.  
Estimates in column 1 of Table 6 indicate that churches with greater total variability in 
membership put significantly less weight on changes in membership when setting 
ministers’ compensation.  The change in total compensation associated with one new 
member for a minister at a high-volatility church is about $12, compared to $23 for a 
minister at a low-volatility church.  Similarly, the results in column 2 suggest that 
churches with membership driven by exogenous variation in oil prices have less pay-for-
performance sensitivity.  A new member in an oil-driven church is associated with a $10 
increase in total compensation, compared to $18 in a less oil-driven church.  Column 3 
includes all interactions simultaneously and provides some evidence that the two effects 
are partially interdependent. 
 
F.  Implicit pay-for-performance due to promotion and demotion 
We conclude our analysis by examining patterns of transfers within the Oklahoma 
United Methodist Conference.  Pastoral rotations among different churches occur 
frequently and are controlled by the Conference administration or Cabinet.  The Cabinet 
could use performance measures to decide when or where to move a minister, and the 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+ Oil prices are from the series, OILPRICE, Spot Oil Price: West Texas Intermediate, from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, downloaded from http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/OILPRICE. 
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change in pay that results from moves could be a function of past performance.  In other 
words, a minister who performs exceptionally well at one church may get “promoted” to 
a bigger, higher-paying church for his or her next appointment.  Part of the increased 
compensation may come from access to especially impressive Parsonage living quarters 
that some parishes own. 
Performance could be rewarded through movement across churches in two ways.  
First, a minister who performs better could move to the next church sooner rather than 
later.  To test for this, we estimate several hazard models where the dependent variable 
(or “spell”) is the length of time that a minister was in place at a particular church.  We 
find no significant relation between the probability that a minister moves in a particular 
year, conditional on not having moved yet, and any of our performance measures.  For 
the sake of brevity, we do not present these results, but instead focus on the second 
potential channel where performance could be rewarded – a change in pay for the 
minister, conditional on a change in churches. 
Table 7 presents results of regressions of changes total compensation against 
performance, using only those years in which a minister takes up a new appointment.  
The model in column 1 begins by examining whether pay changes due to moves are 
related to changes in membership, revenues, or attendance at the previous church.  The 
specification is identical to that used in Table 2, plus an additional variable measuring the 
minister’s previous pay to control for the impact of the tournament nature of 
appointments.  As the results indicate, pay changes for changes in appointments are 
significantly related to membership changes at the minister’s previous church.  In 
addition, the point estimates suggest a larger impact than we observed for within-church 
changes in pay.  Conditional on a move, a new member is associated with an approximate 
$31 increase in total compensation, versus the $9 estimated in Table 2 for within-church 
changes.  The larger estimate for total compensation is also consistent with ministers 
being rewarded by moving to churches with more valuable housing. 
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In column 2, we analyze the impact of the various types of membership changes.  When 
rewarding ministers’ performance through movements across churches, the Conference 
Cabinet appears to focus on the degree to which they were able to attract new United 
Methodists to the church, rather than their ability to attract members to leave one United 
Methodist parish and join another.  The coefficients on members added through 
professions of faith and from other denominations are statistically and economically 
significant.  A new profession of faith is associated with an approximately $209 increase 
in total compensation, conditional on a change in appointment, with similar magnitudes 
for members added from other denominations ($256).  In contrast, adding new members 
from other United Methodist Churches is associated with a much smaller change in pay, 
about $35 in total compensation (not statistically significant). 
Taken together, our results suggest an interesting overall pattern for rewarding 
pay for performance.  While a minister is in place at a local church, his or her pay 
changes depend on changes in membership, especially members that come from or leave 
to other United Methodist Churches.  These effects are more pronounced for churches 
where membership changes are expected to be cleaner signals of the minister’s effort.  
However, these rewards may seem counterproductive in the eyes of the supervising 
Conference Cabinet, which views membership transfers among churches as a zero-sum 
game and is more interested in growing the size of the entire denomination.  When one 
looks at how the Conference as a whole rewards ministers by rotating them across 
churches, the Conference more strongly favors pastors whose churches grow by attracting 
new United Methodists rather than those who grow at the expense of other Methodist 
congregations.  The Conference therefore appears to use promotion-based rewards to 
redress certain unintended consequences of the standard pastoral pay-performance 
framework that prevails at the parish level (see Prendergast, 1999). 
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VI.  Conclusions 
 Our paper investigates patterns of compensation for a large panel dataset of 
ministers in the state of Oklahoma between 1961-2003.  We find evidence that 
compensation follows patterns consistent with principal-agent models of optimal 
contracting.  Although the overall level of ministerial pay is modest, it responds 
significantly to increases and decreases in parish membership.  When we decompose 
membership changes into different categories, we find that the more informative types of 
changes are associated most strongly with changes in pastoral compensation.  Pay-
performance sensitivity is lower when performance variables are volatile in a given 
parish, and also when the church operates in an environment exposed to external 
economic factors such as the price of oil.  Finally, the central church administration 
appears to use its power of ministerial assignment in order to reward productive clergy 
with plum appointments that bring higher total compensation. 
 These results may seem rational to scholars who study agency theory and the 
economics of contracting.  However, they occur in a setting – a major American religious 
denomination – in which one might expect little or no material reward for excellent 
performance.  Although pastors are no doubt motivated by idealism and a variety of non-
pecuniary rewards, our research indicates that incremental financial incentives also 
impact their effort and the quality of service they provide to parishioners. 
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Figure 1 
Income of Methodist ministers compared to Oklahoma statewide averages 
The figure shows a time series of the median compensation for ministers in the United 
Methodist Church in the state of Oklahoma between 1961 and 2003.  For comparison 
purposes, the figure shows per capita personal income for all workers in Oklahoma 
during the same period.  All values are adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2008 
dollars.  Ministers’ income equals the sum of salary, utilities, and the imputed value of 
housing.  Data are obtained from yearbooks published by the Oklahoma Annual 
Conference of the United Methodist Church and from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis. 
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Figure 2 
Parish revenue and per capita income 
The figure shows a time series of the median revenue for United Methodist Church 
parishes in the state of Oklahoma between 1961 and 2003.  For comparison purposes, the 
figure shows per capita personal income for all workers in Oklahoma during the same 
period.  All values are adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2008 dollars.  Revenue is a 
proxy for total parish revenue, equal to total expenses and capital improvements, plus 
changes in other assets, less changes in debt.  Data are obtained from yearbooks 
published by the Oklahoma Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church and from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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Figure 3 
Shawnee Bethel congregation growth and changes in oil prices 
The chart shows annual changes in the membership of the Shawnee Bethel, Oklahoma 
parish of the United Methodist Church, as well as annual changes in the price of oil.  
Shawnee lies in an oil-rich part of the state, and in the 1920s referred to itself as “The Hub 
of the World’s Largest Oil Fields.”
   #'"
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for United Methodist Church parishes in 
Oklahoma from 1961 through 2003.  Total Compensation equals the sum of Salary, 
utilities, and implied rental income.  Salary (per pastor) and Total Compensation (per 
pastor) represent aggregates that account for ministers who serve circuits with more than 
one parish.  Average Attendance and Sunday School Attendance are the mean annual 
values in each parish for attendance Sunday worship services and Sunday School, 
respectively.  Added: Professions of Faith equals the number of new members added for 
the year due to professions or restorations of faith.  Added: Other Denomination and 
Added: Other Methodist represent members added during the year that previously 
belonged to another religious denomination or to other United Methodist churches, 
respectively.  Removed: Action represents members removed due to inactivity.  Removed: 
Withdrawn equals the number of members who leave a parish without reporting other 
reasons.  Revenue is a proxy for total parish revenue, equal to total expenses and capital 
improvements, plus changes in other assets, less changes in debt.  All amounts are 
presented in constant 2008 dollars.  Data are obtained from yearbooks published by the 
Oklahoma Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church. 
 
Variable Mean 
25th 
%ile Median 
75th 
%ile Std. Dev. Obs. 
Salary (per parish) $23,191 $7,768 $20,694 $33,600 $18,554 24,989 
Total Compensation (per 
parish) $30,216 $9,362 $27,360 $43,957 $24,376 24,989 
Salary (per pastor) $29,511 $17,517 $28,389 $37,906 $17,700 19,637 
Total Compensation (per 
pastor) $38,421 $22,651 $36,890 $49,586 $23,130 19,637 
       
Membership 436.57 95 201 443 729.07 24,961 
Average Attendance 115.23 33 65 123 191.63 23,412 
Sunday School Attendance 90.35 25 48 95 152.88 23,980 
Annual Change in Membership 0.54 -3 0 6 38.84 24,989 
Members Added 18.85 2 7 19 39.64 24,989 
Members Removed 18.31 2 6 18 41.99 24,989 
Added: Professions of Faith 6.33 0 2 7 12.39 24,989 
Added: Other Denomination 3.87 0 1 4 10.76 24,989 
Added: From Other Methodist 8.65 0 2 8 20.31 24,989 
Removed: Action 0.52 0 0 0 14.78 24,989 
Removed: Dead 4.34 1 2 5 7.32 24,989 
Removed: Other Denomination 2.20 0 0 2 5.76 24,989 
Removed: To Other Methodist 7.38 0 2 7 16.61 24,989 
Removed: Withdrawn 3.86 0 0 0 24.66 24,989 
       
Revenue $173,543 $22,981 $65,014 $163,011 $424,973 23,676 
Revenue/Membership $355 $219 $315 $440 $227 23,655 
   !"#
Table 2 
Regression estimates of pay-performance sensitivity for ministers 
This table presents regression estimates of changes in pastoral compensation against changes in various performance measures for 
United Methodist Churches in Oklahoma from 1961 through 2003.  Pastors' first years at a particular church are excluded.  Total 
Compensation equals the sum of Salary, utilities, and implied rental income.  Revenue is a proxy for total parish revenue, equal to total 
expenses and capital improvements, plus changes in other assets, less changes in debt.  Average Attendance and Sunday School 
Attendance are the mean annual values in each parish for attendance Sunday worship services and Sunday School, respectively.  All 
performance variables are lagged by one year.  All regressions include year indicator variables.  t-statistics are shown in brackets, 
using standard errors clustered by parish.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using two-
tailed tests. All dollar amounts are presented in 2008 dollars and ! indicates a change in the associated variable. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
!(Total 
Comp.)   
!(Total 
Comp.)   
!(Total 
Comp.)   
!(Total 
Comp.) 
 !(Total 
Comp.) 
  
!Salary   
!(Memberst-1) $11.05 
***       $9.14 *** $7.40 *** 
 [4.27]   
     [4.37]  [5.33]  
!(Average Attendancet-1)   $4.87 
***     $1.73  $1.98  
   [2.71] 
     [0.52]  [0.62]  
!(Sunday School Attendancet-1)    
 $7.09 ***   $6.28 *** $7.95 ** 
    
 [3.48]    [2.82]  [2.45]  
!(Revenuet-1) x 10
-3
    
   -$0.08  -$0.15  -$0.28  
    
   [-0.38]  [-0.66]  [-1.60]  
    
      
   
Observations 15,768  13,854 
 14,414  14,307  12,465  12,465  
R-squared 0.060  0.055 
 0.060  0.054  0.072  0.071  
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of Church Clusters 705  682 
 686  688  671  671  
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Table 3 
Regression estimates of changes in parish revenue 
This table presents regressions of changes in revenues on changes in membership, by 
type, for United Methodist Churches in Oklahoma from 1961 through 2003.  Revenue is a 
proxy for total parish revenue, equal to total expenses and capital improvements, plus 
changes in other assets, less changes in debt.  Definitions of various membership change 
classifications appear in Table 1.  All performance variables are lagged by one year, 
except for the alternative lags of membership changes.  All regressions include year 
indicator variables.  t-statistics are shown in brackets, using standard errors clustered by 
parish.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, 
using two-tailed tests. All dollar amounts are presented in 2008 dollars and ! indicates a 
change in the associated variable. 
 
Dependent Variable: !(Revenue)   !(Revenue)   
Members Addedt-1 $451 
***   
 [4.10]    
Added: From Other Denomination 
 $1,467 * 
   [1.91]  
Added: Professions of Faith   $584  
   [0.73]  
Added: From Other Methodist   $441 * 
   [1.92]  
Members Lostt-1 -$154 
   
 [-1.61]    
Lost: To Other Denomination   -$955  
   [-1.62]  
Lost: To Other Methodist   -$884 *** 
   [-3.39]  
Lost: Withdrawn   $109  
   [0.87]  
Lost: Action   $34  
   [0.76]  
Lost: Death   -$127  
   [-0.43]  
     
Observations 22,446  22,446  
R-squared 0.009  0.012  
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  
Number of Church Clusters 701  701  
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Table 4 
Pay-performance sensitivity with respect to detailed performance measures 
This table presents regression estimates of changes in pastoral compensation against 
changes in various performance measures for United Methodist Churches in Oklahoma 
from 1961 through 2003.  Pastors' first years at a particular church are excluded.  Total 
Compensation equals the sum of Salary, utilities, and implied rental income.  Other 
variable definitions appear in Table 1.  All performance variables are lagged by one year.  
City Church is an indicator variable for churches located in Tulsa or Oklahoma City.  All 
regressions include year indicator variables.  t-statistics are shown in brackets, using 
standard errors clustered by parish.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. All dollar amounts are presented in 
2008 dollars and ! indicates a change in the associated variable. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
 
!(Total 
Comp.)   
!(Total 
Comp.)   
!(Total 
Comp.)   
Members Addedt-1 
 
$14.71 
[5.65] 
*** 
     
Members Lostt-1 
 
-$6.68 
[-3.61] 
*** 
     
Added: Professions of Faith 
  
 
$17.70 
[2.88] 
*** 
 
$16.41 
[2.71] 
*** 
 
Added: From Other Denomination 
 
 
$17.78 
[1.47] 
 
$18.44 
[1.51] 
 
Added: From Other Methodist 
  
 
$32.51 
[4.71] 
*** 
 
$20.59 
[3.41] 
*** 
 
Added: From Other Methodist x City Church 
 
   
$15.97 
[1.77] 
* 
 
Lost: Action 
  
 
$0.36 
[0.22] 
 
-$0.02 
[-0.01] 
 
Lost: Death 
  
 
$2.69 
[0.42] 
 
$3.01 
[0.48] 
 
Lost: To Other Denomination 
 
 
-$8.44 
[-0.81] 
 
-$8.65 
[-0.86] 
 
Lost: To Other Methodist 
  
 
-$43.39 
[-6.74] 
*** 
 
-$22.97 
[-3.77] 
*** 
 
Lost: To Other Methodist x City Church 
 
   
-$32.69 
[-3.40] 
*** 
 
Lost: Withdrawn 
  
 
$1.20 
[0.63] 
 
$0.94 
[0.48] 
 
City Church 
  
   
$414.10 
[4.16] 
*** 
 
Observations 
R-squared 
Year Fixed Effects 
Number of Church Clusters 
15,768 
0.064 
Yes 
705 
 
15,768 
0.073 
Yes 
705 
 
15,768 
0.075 
Yes 
705 
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Table 5 
Additional models of pay-performance sensitivity for ministers 
This table presents regression estimates of pastoral compensation for United Methodist 
Churches in Oklahoma from 1961 through 2003.  The first two columns show regressions 
of the change in total pastoral compensation as a function of lagged values of changes in 
church membership.  The right column shows the natural log of total compensation as a 
function of the natural log of church membership lagged one year.  Pastors' first years at a 
particular church are excluded.  Total Compensation equals the sum of Salary, utilities, 
and implied rental income.  All regressions include year indicator variables, and the 
model in the right column includes fixed effects for each unique pastor-church pair.  t-
statistics are shown in brackets, using standard errors clustered by parish.  ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
All dollar amounts are presented in 2008 dollars and ! indicates a change in the 
associated variable. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
!(Total 
Comp.)   
!(Total 
Comp.)   
Ln(Total 
Comp.)   
!(Memberst-1) $6.63 
** $3.54    
 [2.54]  [1.07]    
!(Memberst-2) $6.24 
*** $7.21 ***   
 [4.22]  [3.28]    
!(Memberst-3)  
 $4.21 *   
   [1.86]    
Ln(Memberst-1)  
   0.35 *** 
     [9.75]  
       
Total Estimated Impact of 
!(Members) $12.87  $14.96    
F-Statistic for Sum of Coefficients 18.43 *** 18.38 ***   
       
Observations 9,485  5,686  23,766  
R-squared 0.070  0.068  0.136  
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Pastor-Church Fixed Effects No  No  Yes  
Number of Pastor-Church Combinations    8,641  
Number of Church Clusters 674  642  660  
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Table 6 
Pay-performance sensitivity and risk factors 
This table presents regression estimates of changes in pastoral compensation against 
changes in membership for United Methodist Churches in Oklahoma from 1961 through 
2003.  Pastors' first years at a particular church are excluded.  Total Compensation equals 
the sum of Salary, utilities, and implied rental income.  High Volatility is an indicator 
variable for churches whose time series volatility of annual percentage changes in 
membership lies above the sample median.  Oil Driven is an indicator variable based 
upon regressions of each church’s membership changes as a function of oil price 
changes; the indicator equals 1 for churches with above-median values of the goodness-
of-fit measure.  Avg. Membership is the average membership for each church over the 
sample period.  All regressions include year indicator variables.  t-statistics are shown in 
brackets, using standard errors clustered by parish.  ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. All dollar amounts are 
presented in 2008 dollars and ! indicates a change in the associated variable. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
!(Total 
Comp.)   
!(Total 
Comp.)   
!(Total 
Comp.)  
!(Memberst-1) $22.63 
*** $18.48 *** $23.44 ***#
 [4.91]  [5.85]  [5.13] #
!(Memberst-1) x High Volatility -$10.75 
***   -$8.45 **#
 [-2.59]    [-2.16] #
!(Memberst-1) x Oil Driven 
 -$8.06 ** -$5.67 *#
   [-2.26]  [-1.69]# #
!(Memberst-1) x Avg. Membership x 10
-3
 -3.29 ** -1.90 ** -3.09 ***#
 [-2.42]  [-2.03]  [-2.63]  
       
Observations 15,760  15,758  15,758  
R-squared 0.062  0.062  0.063  
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of Church Clusters 698  696  696  
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Table 7 
Pay-performance estimates for changes in church appointments 
This table presents regression estimates of changes in pastoral compensation against 
changes in membership for United Methodist Churches in Oklahoma from 1961 through 
2003.  The sample includes only observations for pastors whose church appointment 
changes during the year, so that changes in compensation for the new church versus the 
old is regressed against performance in the pastor’s last year in the old church.  All 
variable definitions are the same is in Tables 4 and 6.  All regressions include year 
indicator variables.  t-statistics are shown in brackets, using standard errors clustered by 
parish.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, 
using two-tailed tests. All dollar amounts are presented in 2008 dollars and ! indicates a 
change in the associated variable. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
 
!(Total Comp 
|Move) 
  
  
!(Total Comp 
|Move)   
 
!(Memberst-1) 
 
$30.91 
[3.67] 
*** 
   
!(Revenuest-1) ) x 10
-3 
 
$1.17 
[0.94]  
$1.60 
[1.59]  
!(Average Attendancet-1) 
 
-$0.96 
[-0.36]  
$4.02 
[1.25]  
!(Sunday School Attendancet-1) 
 
-$3.64 
[-0.81]  
-$4.59 
[-1.45]  
Added: Professions of Faith 
   
$208.5 
[5.00] 
*** 
 
Added: From Other Denominations 
 
 
$255.9 
[3.29] 
*** 
 
Added: From Other Methodist 
   
$38.11 
[1.53]  
Lost: Action 
   
-$35.29 
[-0.74]  
Lost: Dead 
   
$5.88 
[0.10]  
Lost: To Other Denomination 
 
 
-$4.00 
[-0.07]  
Lost: To Other Methodist 
   
-$5.98 
[-0.23]  
Lost: Withdrawn 
   
$0.26 
[0.03]  
Total Compt-1 
 
-0.196 
[-10.49] 
*** 
 
-0.298 
[-12.92] 
*** 
 
 
Observations 
R-squared 
Year Fixed Effects 
2,929 
0.122 
Yes  
2,929 
0.157 
Yes  
"
